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This paper proposes a class of decomposable poverty measures. It incorporates ideas of
flexible minimum basic requirement norms, relative deprivation and the presence of public
transfer systems. Public transfers oftentimes take the form of implicit transfers and are not
usually reflected in the reported income figures. Depending on the access and usage of public
transfer systems, real consumption possibility can be very different for different individuals.
This paper demonstrates that a poverty measure can be used in a straightforward manner to
derive a metric to evaluate the efficiency of the public transfer systems to reach their
intended targets. Some of the policy implications are also provided.
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper shows that a properly modified poverty measure can also serve as a measure of the 
target efficiency of public transfer programs. Target efficiency of a public transfer system can be 
defined as the ability of the public authorities to effectively target the deserving population through 
that transfer policy. The poverty measure proposed in this paper is a member of the generalised class 
of decomposable poverty measures first proposed by Foster et al (1984) [henceforth, FGT(1984)]. 
Therefore, it satisfies many desirable properties like monotonicity, subgroup additivity etc. as argued 
below. Besides, it has the added power that it can be used explicitly to measure the performance of 
public welfare programs thus according considerable power to the proposed measure from a policy-
relevant point of view. 
An appropriate notion of income for the purpose of poverty measurement has always been an 
area of major debate in the poverty measurement literature (Sen (1976, 1992), Atkinson (1987)). 
Adequate income is needed to buy goods and services enough to maintain a living standard 
considered normatively minimally acceptable. Any person not being able to enjoy that normative 
minimum level of living is adjudged to be poor. Such minimum income is usually called the 
“poverty line.” But once we fix the poverty line at any level, the measurement of poverty is relatively 
straightforward (Sen (1976, 1992), FGT (1984)). For example, in the head count measure of poverty 
it just involves counting the people below the poverty line and expressing it as a fraction of the total 
population.   
Oftentimes, people receive subsidies and benefits from public sources in the form of implicit 
transfers that are not directly reflected in reported income. Therefore, to reach an appropriate 
income-figure, we need to adjust the reported income figure by the value of the subsidies and 
benefits. This is required since benefits offered by the public authorities oftentimes enter individuals’ 
consumption basket directly thereby increasing their real welfare. Command over real consumption 
basket can differ widely even at the same level of reported earning with or without access to publicly 
subsidised goods or services. Since, real consumption basket is a true indicator of individual welfare 
levels, subsidy can considerably change the welfare profile of the population if we do not take this 
into account explicitly.  
A convenient example can well-illustrate the point just made. Take two people who are 
earning $100.00 a month each. Person A has no access to any subsidy and he can only buy meat from 
the market at a rate of $4.00/pound. Person B has access to publicly provided subsidised food and 
she can buy meat from a public distribution shop at a subsidised rate of $2.00/pound. However, she 
has also the option of buying meat from the market at the same price as person A. These two people 
enjoy quite different command over goods. Assuming meat is the only consumption good available, 
real possible consumption basket of person A amounts to 25 pounds and that of person B is 50 
pounds. Suppose the meat-poverty-line is set at 26 pounds per person per month. Clearly, even at the 
same level of reported income, while person A will be poor and person B will not be poor if she 
chooses to buy sufficient amount of meat from the public distribution shop.   
Many countries offer subsidies towards improving welfare of their people. Such subsidies are 
often geared towards alleviating suffering of the poor people. The Public Distribution System (PDS) 
in India is one such case in point. The aim of PDS in India is to provide food security to middle and 
lower income residents of urban India at a cheap govt. announced price. Such prices are usually well 
below the normal market price. Sometimes policymakers and researchers are concerned if the 
deserving population is being targeted well or not (Dutta & Ramaswami 2001, 2004; Tarozzi 2005;   2
Umali-Deininger & Deininger 2001.) Suppose, poverty reduction is the stated goal of a hypothetical 
public welfare system (like PDS in India). We may be interested to know if the program is working 
well or not in terms of reducing poverty. 
The basic concepts of this paper is also applicable to cases of spatial variation of prices 
especially induced by subsidies. It is also applicable to contexts where different segments of the 
population faces policy mandated price variation in essential commodities (like food, fuel, medicine, 
housing etc.) For example, in a developed country the USA, publicly subsidized housing and medical 
services are quite prevalent (Grigsby & Bourassa 2003.)    
Sen (1976, 1992) proposed some properties that an “ethical” measure of poverty should 
satisfy. I’ll discuss them in the context of the current paper in Section 3. It will be shown that the 
measure proposed in this paper satisfies the “ethical” properties proposed by Sen (1976, 1992). We 
will closely follow the formulation in FGT(1984) and extend their ideas towards a more direct 
measure that can measure poverty and target efficiency of public transfer systems simultaneously. 
FGT (1984) remains a seminal study in the literature of poverty measurement in that it allows us to 
explicitly address the question of sub-group poverty and study the contribution of group specific 
poverty to the total population poverty.  
The poverty measure proposed in this paper may be considered as an extension of the seminal 
paper, FGT (1984.) As will be elaborated below, this paper extends the notion of income in FGT 
(1984) to the domain of consumer expenditure based poverty measurement especially in the situation 
where some implicit transfer through subsidy is not explicitly accounted. Thus the message of this 
paper is complements FGT (1984.)   
Rest of this paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 provides the basic definitions 
used in this paper and proposes construction of a particular poverty measure; Section 3 discusses the 
properties of the proposed measure; Section 4 discusses how the proposed measure could be used to 
evaluate the efficiency of different public transfer regimes and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Measure 
Consider an economy of N people where the income of the person i is denoted by  i x , 
N i ,...., 2 , 1 = . Let  ) ,...., , ( 2 1 N x x x x =  be an ordered vector of personal incomes in increasing order. 
There is a government/public-authority that indulges in public support activities with direct benefits 
accruing to the individuals. To support its activities the govt. raises taxes. Therefore, the income of 
the individual may be viewed as a net disposable income.  
Public support projects may include Public Distribution System (PDS), education subsidy, 
public health provision, unemployment benefit, social security transfer etc. In this paper I am 
concerned more with the kind of transfers that directly affect consumption of an individual. Clearly, 
some of the transfers mentioned above involve direct nominal transfer & others take the form of 
implicit subsidy. To bring them to the same platform, we need to be concerned only with the amount 
of benefit measured in nominal (monetary) terms, going to the individual i. x therefore, shall include 
incomes from labour or services or from accumulated assets & not any public transfer.  
Suppose, individual i needs a socially acceptable normative minimum amount of Wi . Among 
other things Wi  depends on age, gender, health condition, physical abilities, nature of occupation etc. 
of the concerned individual. Clearly, this is the most generalised framework in that it allows for a   3
completely different poverty line for each individual. In real world, poverty lines are usually kept 
constant over population groups. The framework proposed here is easily amenable to multiple 
poverty lines defined over mutually exclusive subgroups.   
  It is assumed that the socially acceptable minimum norm to be exogenously given.     
Contingent upon the same demographic and other criteria mentioned above, i
th individual is allowed 
a maximum public benefit of qi. This is measured in the same nominal units as income. It is also 
assumed that  i q  is exogenously given. Let, individual i avail a public benefit of  i q where  qq ii ≤ . 
Therefore, the non-usage of public benefit ( e
i q ) can be defined to be: qq q i
e
ii =−≥ 0. 
Let,  i i i q    x   W + = ≡ effective earning of the individual i. Therefore, for individual i, 
shortfall of income from the socially acceptable normative minimum income requirement may be 
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Where  AWq ii i ≡−  &  Bxq ii i
e ≡− 
Ai, therefore, is the income needed net of maximum possible public benefit available to live at 
the socially acceptable normative minimum level. The explanation for Bi is not as straightforward as 
Ai . Bi  may be interpreted as the nominal loss that individual i suffers due to the non-usage of public 
benefit. If in some situation, qq ii =  , the individual suffers no loss and enjoys all the possible 
benefits that she is entitled to coming from her personal income and public transfer. Now, we can 
characterise the poor and non-poor in the population in the following manner: 
Individual i is poor if  AB ii ≥ or, () () Wq x q ii ii
e −≥−…….………(1) 
Individual i is non-poor  AB ii < or, () () Wq xq ii ii
e −<−…………(2) 
(See Appendix for a formal discussion).  
Let’s define an Efficient Public Transfer Regime (EPTR, henceforth) as a situation where 
qWx ii i ≤−  & qi ≥ 0.  In other words, under EPTR, transfers are directed only to them who are 
living below the socially acceptable normative minimal level. (We shall see the use of this assertion 
in section 3). This also means that the public authorities need not provide any transfer to those for 
whom Wx ii ≤ .  
The EPTR assumption is quite logical given the fact that any public transfer system involves 
drain of costly resources on the part of the public authorities and may subsequently involve higher 
economic burden for the population as a whole. It is also assumed that the sole idea behind any 
public transfer system is to ensure some basic minimum level of living for the population. But, more 
often than not, public transfers are also directed to people who are living above the socially 
acceptable normative minimum level. But, in this paper I shall only be concerned about the transfers 
going to the needy ones. A direct example of such transfer would include poverty alleviating 
subsidies. Therefore, efficiency of a public transfer system shall only try to capture the ability of 
public authorities to reach the needy (poor) people and eliminating poverty from the economy.      4
Clearly, Zi  is a function of Wqx q iii i , , & . I allow the functional forms to be different for 
different individuals to accommodate for the differences in individual tastes and needs. Although 
such functional forms will not play any role in the context of the current paper, I will assume that 
they exist in the background. Note that Wq x ii i , & are given for an individual and he is only allowed 
to vary qi. Clearly, this is an ex-post way of looking at things. I am not taking into account the 
problems of endogenous labor supply, occupational choice and hence income. Similarly, it is 
implicitly assumed that it is costless to monitor individual needs and hence we can figure out the 
basic minimum needs of any given individual. Again, such an assumption need not be that extreme. 
All we need are different “poverty lines” for different segment of the population.  
People may differ in their notion about public transfer system. They may therefore choose not 
to utilise the benefits. Distance, waiting time, time of distribution, insufficient quality etc. may 
prompt people to stay away from public distribution of grains, for example. It may also be the case 
that no distribution shop is available in a wide area. People may not take the benefit of the transfer 
system because they do not feel any need for it. There may be social stigma attached towards 
participation in such transfer systems. In a society where interpersonal income may not be commonly 
known, the observable fact that somebody participates in the public transfer system may give out the 
credible information that a particular person is poor and the person under consideration may not like 
it. However, due to the presence of binding wealth/consumption constraints, poor people are always 
assumed to be better off if they use the public transfers.  











. This measure is akin to FGT(1984) measure. But, given the special kind of 
construction we followed above, it is significantly wider in its scope. In the above expression α can 
be interpreted as measure closely resembling Atkinson-ian measure of poverty aversion. A large α  
gives more weight to the poor. As α approaches infinity, the poverty measure approaches an ideal 
“Rawlsian” measure where only the poorest person (a situation where absolute deprivation is 
maximum) is given maximum weight. Also note that the concept of relative deprivation of poverty is 
embedded in the poverty measure. I will come back to the point in section 3.  
The poverty measure proposed is not bounded in [0, 1]. In fact, given the current construction 
it takes any non-negative value. This might look a little unattractive at the outset. But this poses no 
particular problem as such. Please note that an alternate specification of 


























α . As long as the socially acceptable minimum 










 is just a constant. Also note that this 









1 α . This pertains to the extreme situation where all the 
poor people have nothing.  
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3. Properties of  P α (.) 
Sen (1976, 1992) proposed two axioms for an “ethical measure” of poverty to satisfy:  
Monotonicity Axiom: Ceteris paribus, a reduced income for a poor person should result in an 
increase in the poverty measure. 
Transfer Axiom: Ceteris paribus, a pure income transfer from a poorer to a richer person should 
increase the poverty measure. 
 
Proposition 1: For α α > 0, P  satisfies monotonicity and for α α >1, P  satisfies transfer axioms.  
 
Proof:  Since,  P α (.) is a monotonic function of Zi it is sufficient to show that Zi follows 
monotonicity. A reduced income for a household can be interpreted in two ways either as a reduction 













& ≤ 0 meaning thereby that a reduction 
in income for the poorer household will lead to an increase in the poverty measure. 
To check the transfer axiom part, let’s consider two different individuals j and k whose 
shortfalls are given by Zj and Zk respectively where Zk > Zj. Since, the shortfall of person k is higher 
















( ) where i, j and k are different. Now, 
consider a transfer t>0 from k to j (poorer person to richer person). As a result of this transfer, the 
shortfall of person k will increase and that of person j will get reduced. The new value of the poverty 





































{( ) ( ) }
(/ ) { }
    
Where “R” contains other residual terms from the binomial expansion. It is easy to check that R is 
strictly positive for α >1. Q.E.D 
 
Proposition 2:  P α satisfies the “sub-group monotonicity axiom” proposed in FGT(1984). 
 
Proof: Consider n mutually exclusive subgroups where Ni denotes the total population in subgroup I 
and  Ki denotes the number of poor people in the same. Hence, 
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It is easy to see that the aggregate poverty measure is a weighted average of the subgroup poverty 
measures. Thus, other things remaining constant, and increased poverty in any subgroup will lead to 
a rise in the aggregate measure and vice-versa. Q.E.D 
 
FGT(1984) has laid out in detail about various attractive aspects of the “sub-group monotonicity” 
property. They have also pointed out that Sen measure and its variants do not satisfy this property 
because their overwhelming emphasis on ranking individuals.  
The construction followed here allows one to incorporate maximum possible variability in the 
minimum requirement norms. This means that it is possible to conceptualise completely different 
norm for every individual. At one extreme it means that every person can be thought of as a different 
subgroup. However, the flexibility in the minimum norm requirement allows us to consider 
subgroups defined along ethnic, geographical or any other criteria. Also note that in the proposed 
poverty measure the minimum requirement norm does not appear as a normalising factor. Only 
deviations from the “norm” matter. So long as alternative norms are scale-preserving, the measure, 
appropriately scaled, will convey an invariant picture. This opens up scope for cross-sectional studies 
involving any degree of heterogeneity.     
 
4. Target Efficiency Evaluation 
Let us assume an Efficient Public Transfer Regime (EPTR). Target efficiency means the success 
of the public authority to reach the fruits of transfer to the actual target. Since, under EPTR, transfers 
are directed only to them who need it, this also means that given the same amount of resources 
available for transfer, a more successful public transfer system will reduce poverty more than a less 
successful one. Intuitively, success of the public transfer system should get reflected in the changes 
of the magnitude of poverty. The assumption that poor people are always better off availing public 
transfer because of the presence of the binding constraints plays a very crucial role in this context.    








≤ 0 for qq ii ∈(, ) 0  and for qq Z ii i == ,0 . It is easy to note that under EPTR,  P α  is 
bounded below by 0. Let  P α
max  denote the value of the poverty measure when ∀= iq i ,0  or, ZC ii =  
for all i. Hence, 0 ≤≤ PP αα







max , 0. Clearly, E ∈[,] 01 . Thus, lower 
the value of E, higher is the target efficiency of public transfer system. A completely target 
inefficient public transfer system is characterised by E=1. A value of E=0 is attained if the public 
authorities have enough money available to eliminate poverty altogether and perhaps more 
importantly, they can target the available resources precisely without any lose.  
The intuition goes in the following manner: For given distribution of income, maximum poverty 
is attained in a state where no public poverty alleviation system is available or even if it exists, it 
fails completely to reach the target population. If the poverty alleviation system reaches its targets 
perfectly well then, nobody will remain poor in this economy. Again, the statement just made 
assumes away any resource constraint at the public transfer system level. Also, it is easy to see that 
even with limited resources and well-targeting, E should be falling. That implies more and more 
people are effectively taken out of the poverty net through the poverty alleviation scheme.     7
  
5. Conclusion 
I developed in this paper a measure of poverty taking into consideration the presence of 
public transfer system. Public transfers (like subsidies) allow people to consume above their current 
level of income. Thus a purely observed income based poverty measure in the presence of public 
transfer will overestimate poverty. The construction followed above also allows us to find a measure 
to evaluate target efficiency of the public transfer system. This measure may have a good use in lot of 
developing countries (like India) where a large number of public transfer systems are maintained just 
in the name of poor but in reality a large part of them are misdirected. Given sub-group monotonicity 
property of the poverty measure developed, it is possible to construct E-values for any number of 
sub-groups and thus there is an large scope for fine-tuning the policy measures especially if we are 
interested in finding out if certain groups are properly targeted or not.      
  
Appendix 
Suppose, Wq xq ii ii
e −= > & 0 and hence, Wq xq iiii
e −>−. It looks as if the person concerned is 
earning the minimum tolerable level of earning and yet he is considered poor. But, 
WW xq xq q Z iii i i ii
e
i − ≡+−−≡ > ⇔> ⇔ 0 0 the person is poor. 
It can also be the case that a person is earning more than the net (of public benefit) minimum income 
but not being able to reach the socially acceptable normative minimum one. Technically, 
Wq xq iiii
e −< > & 0 such that Wq xq Wxq iiii
e
iii −>−⇔ >+. Thus, inequality 1 is sufficient 
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